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COMES NOW, the Appellant, City of Boise City, by and through its attorneys of record, 
and hereby files its reply brief in the above-captioned matter. 
A. THE DISTRICT JUDGES OF THE FOURTII JUDICIAL DISTRICT ERRED IN  
=FUSING TO VACATE TBE 1980 O m E R  BECAUSE IT IS  UNDISPUTED 
THAT ADA COUNTY C NTLY PROVIDES THE MAGISTRATE 
FACILITIES. 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that is to be reviewed de novo by the 
appellate court. Kidd Island Bay Water Users Coop. Ass'n v. Miller, 136 Idaho 57 1, 573 (2001). 
Idaho Code $§ 1-2217 and -2218 were interpreted in Twin Falls County v. City of Twin Falls (In 
re Idaho Code 1-2218), 143 Idaho 398 (2006) and the interpretation contained therein controls 
the outcome in this case. 
Ada County argues that Idaho Code $5 1-2217 and -2218 are not "~nutually exclusive." 
Twin Falls County held otheiwise: "These stahites clearly coillemplate two distinct scenarios". 
Id., at 400. The decision was clear that under these statutes either the county provides the 
magistrate facilities in which case it pays the expenses to operate it or the city provides the 
magistrate facilities in which case it pays the expenses to operate it. 
Both the Order of the Fourth Judicial District Judges and th'e argument of Ada County 
elevates form over substance. The district court reasoned, that because Boise City accounts for 
the greatest number and percentage of misdcrneanor and infraction filings it was appropriate that 
Boise City fulfill its obligations under the 1980 Order "by paying for a portion of the operating 
expenses of the new courthouse and by reimbursing Ada County for the expenses of those Boise 
City einployees who became Ada County employees." (R. p. 71, Ls. 7 - 9) Yet, the Fourth 
Judicial District Judges justified their decision by rationalizing that because the 1980 Order did 
not require Boise City to conhibute lo the costs of operating the Ada County Courthouse, it does 
1 
not violate Idaho Code 31-2217 or -2218 and it does not violate the holding in Twin Falls 
County. (R. p. 11, Ls. 6 - 14) In 2008, the Fourth Judicial District Judges were not ordering 
Boise City to provide its own building, they were orderillg Boise City to continue to pay a 
portion of the operating expenses for the new courthouse and the personnel necessary to operate 
the new courlhouse. The Fourth Judicial District Judges erred because once Ada County began 
providing the facilities for the magistrate's division in 2002, the 1980 Order, Idaho Code $5 1- 
2217 aid -2218 make it clear that Ada County is responsible for the costs of operating the 
facilities. The decision in Twin Falls County makes it inipossihle to justify continuation of the 
1980 Order under the facts of this case. 
Ada County argues that there "is nothing in the Idaho Code, including 5 1-221 8, which 
prohibits a city, once properly ordered by the district judges to provide suitable and adequate 
quarters for a magistrate's division, from arranging with a county to move its magistrate court 
into a county-owned building, and contracting with that county to pay its proportionate share of 
expenses." (Resp't Br., p. 15) This is precisely the effect that the decision in Twin Falls County 
held was not permitted by Idaho Code 3s 1-2217 and -2218. "Idaho Code section 1-2218 simply 
does not include district judges ordering the Cities to put up the money for the operations of a 
court house provided by the County." Twin Falls County, 143 Idaho at 400. It cannot be 
disputed that the intended effect of the 2008 Order entered by the Fourth Judicial District Judges 
was to require Boise City to continue to reimburse Ada County for a proportionate share of the 
expe~lses Ada County incurs to provide the magistrate facilities. Boise City has no such statutory 
obligation under the facts which exist today. Only Ada County is obligated to provide the 
expenses to operate the magistrate facilities it alone provides. 
Ada County argues that Twin Falls County "would seem to encourage" such an outcome. 
(Resp't Br., p. 15) Twin Falls County does not encourage it. It recognized that the statutory 
scheme was not necessarily the most efficient method of handling the issue, but it was for the 
legislature to change it, not the courts. 
While it niay seem inefficient to order each of the Cities to provide their own 
building, instead of ordering each City to contribute cash to the County to pay its 
proportionate share, that does not justify ignoring the plain wording of the statute. 
An amendment to the statutes to provide greater efficiency is left to the 
legislature, not the courts. 
Twin Falls County, 143 Idaho at 400. 
Although the Fourth Judicial District Judges stated at the outset of their decision that the 
"validity and effect" of the 1999 Memorandum of Understanding between Boise City and Ada 
County was not at issue, it could not bc ignored. (R. p. 68) The Fourth Judicial District Judges 
observed that by approving and executing the 1999 Memorandum of U~lderstaading, Boise City 
"acltnowledged" that it "remained obligated by the 1980 Order to continue to provide facilities 
for a magistrate's division" even after the Ada County Courthouse was operational. (R. pp. 70 - 
71) Ada County argues that by not rescinding the I980 Order, the Fourth Judicial District 
Judges "col~ectly found that Boise City does in fact have a continuing obligation under the 
[I9801 Order." (Resp't Br., p. 15) 
While giving lip service to the right of a city to decide how it will provide facilities if 
ordered to do so by the district judges, the clear implication is that the Fourth Judicial District 
Judges and Ada County consider that the only way is for Boise City to continue to comply with 
the 1999 Memorandum of Understanding and pay Ada County for its proportionate share of the 
expenses of operating the magistrate court facilities provided by Ada County. That result, of 
course, is driven by the undisputed fact that Ada County has, since 2002, provided "suitable and 
adequate facilities for the magistrate's division of the district court." Twin Falls County made it 
clear that the "entity which provides the building also provides the expenses associated with 
operatiilg it." Twin Falls County, 143 Idaho at 400. Boise City has no obligation to reimburse 
Ada County for a proportionate share of the expenses of operating the magistrate court facilities. 
Based on the decision in Twin Falls County, Boise City has a valid legal argument that the 1999 
Memorandum of Agreement is not enforceable. Miller v. Haller, 129 Idaho 345, 351 (1996) 
(The general rule is that a contract prohibited by law is illegal and hence unenforceable and this 
same rule applies equally to conhacts that are violative of public policy.) Ada County would 
like to avoid direct litigation over whether the 1999 Memorandum of Agreement is enforceable. 
The 1980 Order is no loiiger necessary and the only possible purpose to be served by it today is 
to force Boise City to continue to contribute and reimburse Ada County for costs Ada County is 
required by statute to provide. 
This case did not involve an exercise of discretionary authority by the Judges of the 
Fourth Judicial District.' "Whether a statute applies to a given set of facts is a question of law." 
Kidd Island Bay Watev Useis Coop. Ass'n v. Miller, 136 Idaho 571, 573 (2001). Ada County 
provides the facilities and must also provide the expenses to operate it. The cause and effect are 
clear under Idaho Code 5 § 1-221 7 and -22 18. 
' The Fourth Judicial District Judges suggested that the decision was an exercise of discretionaiy 
authority. (R. p. 75) Statutory interpretation is a question of law. Application of the statute to 
the facts is also a question of law. Idaho Code 5 5  1-2217 and -2218 are not discretionary. The 
use of the tern "shall" in these statutes is mandatory and enforcement is not discretionary with 
the district court. Bedlev v. Fvenzoizt Counly, 182 P.3d 713 (Idaho Ct. App. 2008). 
Ada County misunderstands the argument of Boise City regarding Idaho Code 5 31- 
3201.4. Ada County suggests that ~ o i s e c i t ~  is arguing that it no longer has an obligation under 
the 1980 Order because it no longer receives the $5.00 fee which is to he paid to the city's 
general fund when the city provides the facilities for the magistrate's division. That is not the 
argument. Boise City's argument is that it no longer has an obligation under the 1980 Order 
because Ada County is providing the facilities and, as a consequence, must provide the expenses 
associated with operating it. The $5.00 fee is simply an additional statutory recognition that the 
entity providing the facilities is the entity which must pay its operation. Twin Falls County 
found that it was significant that the legislature already provided a statutory scheme for cost 
sharing: "any sharing of costs is accounted for in LC. S 31-3201A, which, like LC. $4 1-2217 
and -2218, makes a distinction between magistrate cout  facilities provided by a city and those 
provided by a county." Twin Falls Counly, 143 Idaho at 400. The fact that Ada County now 
receives the $5.00 fee in the first instance is further proof and recognition that Ada County 
provides the facilities and is, therefore, the only entity obligated to pay for the expenses of 
operating it. 2 
in addition, the County is statutorily mandated to distribute a $2.50 fee to a city that provides 
the magistrate court facility. Idaho Code 4 31-3210A(a) - (b). This is in addition to the $5.00 
fee. Ada County has not distributed the $2.50 fee to the City since the beginning of the third 
quarter of FIT-2000. (R., Ex. 7, Faw Aff. para. 6.)  
B. NETTllER TEE STATUTES NOR THE O m E R S  A R E  CONSTITUTIONAL. 
The County's entire argument rests upon one assumption: That there are two magistrate 
divisions within the Ada County District Court. One magistrate division is "Boise City's." The 
other magistrate division is Ada County's. This flies in the face of Idaho's court reform. It is 
abundantly clear that cities no longer have city courts as a purpose.3 Courts are a county purpose. 
1. There is Only One  magistrate Division in each County. 
The Idaho Constitution allows the legislature to establish courts inferior to the Supreme 
Court. Idaho Const., art. V, 5 2. The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law. It can 
only "empower . . . an official to ascertain the existence of the facts or conditions mentioned in 
[an] act upon which the law becomes operative." Boise Redevelopment Agency v. Yick Kong, 94 
Idaho 876, 885 (1972) (quoting Foeller v. IIousing Authorily of Portland, 256 P.2d 752 (Or. 
1953)). The legislature has established one magistrate's division in each county within a judicial 
district. Idaho Code 5 1-2201. The legislature may grant authority to the district court to create a 
separate unit within the magistrate division. For instance, a district court may have a Small 
Claims Department. Idaho Code 5 1-2301. However, there is no statutory authority for the 
creation of a separate magistrate division or department for a city's misdemeanors and 
infractions. The Ada County District Court has one magistrate division. 
3 City misdemeanor courts may oilly be established by ihe legislature and it may only do so 
when it is necessary. 
The legislature may provide for the establishment of special courts for the trial of 
misdemeanors in incorporated cities and towns, where the same may be 
necessary. 
Idaho Const, art. V, 5 14. This legislative authority is non-delegable. Boise Redeveloprnent 
Agency v. Yick Kong Corp., 94 Idaho 876,885 (1972). 
2. The Order Imposes a Financial Liability Upon the City Thus Forcing a Tax 
Levy. 
The County akgues that the Order is not the equivalent of a tax because the "language of 
the 1980 Order . . . does not even contemplate taxation." (Resp't Br. at 19.) Whether the 
language "contemplated" a tax is not the point. The Order imposes a duty or financial liability 
upon the City to spend City money. The Order upon the City in essence forced a tax levy on city 
residents, In Idaho County v. Fenn Highway District, 253 P. 377 (Idaho 1926), the Courl 
explained that it was unconstitutional for a highway district to 
impose a duty upon the county to expend county money, because of its 
determination to build a road which may, in effect, benefit the county at large. To 
do so would be to vest in the district, through a court, the power to determine that 
that was for the county's benefit in whatever great or slight degree it nzight 
adjudicate, and in effect impose a burden upon the county and thus force a tax 
levy." 
Id. at 379. The same is true here. The Administrative Orders impose a duty upon the City to 
expend City money, and impose a burden upon the City, thus forcing a tax levy. It hinds the City 
financially. It is a forced tax levy not by the choice of the city residents or their elected officials, 
but by the 1980 and 2008 Orders 
3. County's Three-Legged Stool Taxation Argument Is Missing a Leg. 
The County argues that there is no duplicate or non-u~liform taxation. To illustrate its 
point, the County analogizes the c o w  funding to a three-legged stool. 
An analogy regarding the funding of the district court in Ada County, 
mcluding the entire magistrate d~vision, is a three-legged stool - Ada County's 
general fiulds finances the first leg (the Court Clerk), the district court fund 
finances the second leg (district court clerks, secretaries for district judges, all jury 
costs, the operations of the office of the Trial Court Adminishator, mediation, 
interpreter and guardian services, and the operations of the marshal's office), and 
Boise City's reimbursement payments under the Agreement finances the third leg 
(that portion ofthe magistrate court attributable to Boise City's usage). 
(Resp't Br. at 22.) 
Ada County fails to discuss the fourth leg: the criminal magistrate court attributable 
solely to the other cities and unincorporated county. By the County's own calculation the other 
cities and the county accouilt for nearly half of criminal magistrate cases. (Resp't Br. p. 33) Ada 
County omits this leg because it would have lo explain that Boise City taxpayers pay for that 
portion 01 the criminal magistrate court attributable not just to its own cases, hut also for the 
combined jurisdictions outside of the City (Meridian, Garden City, Kuna, Eagle, Star and 
unincorporated Ada County). 
The County tries to ignore its taxation conundrum by simply explaining how the court is 
finded. "Since there is no overlapping of the funding . . . there can be no duplicative taxation." 
(Resp't Br. at 23.) This is fundamentaliy incorrect. Funding and taxation are two separate and 
distinct functions. Fu~lding, which need not be uniform, is "how" a govermnent entity 
apportions or appvopriates its taxes and other revenue. Board of Tuustees v. Board of Counq 
Commissioners, 83 Idaho 172, 178 (1961) (explaining that proceeds of a tax levy may be 
apportioned unevenly). Taxing, unlike appropriating, must be uniform and non-duplicative 
within the district. In Robbins v. Joint Class A. School District No. 331, 72 Idaho 500 (1952) 
(superceded by statute), a uniformity in taxation issue was raised. The school district in 
Minidolta County had recently reorganized as a Joint District. Prior to reorganization there had 
existed, wholly within the reorganized area, a Rural High School District. Some electors from 
the former Rural High School District petitioned the trustees of the newly reorganized Joint 
District to call an election within the former High School District to vote on whether to continue 
the High School. Id. at 503. The Joint School District Trustees failed to call the election. 
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Electors petitioned for a writ of mandate to compel the electiort. Amongst other issues, t l ~ e  Joint 
School District Trustees argued that if the election passed, there would be a lack of uniformity in 
taxation. Id. at 503, 506. The Court held otherwise. The Court acknowledged the difference 
hetwem taxation and appropriations within a district. It explained that the "taxes throughout the 
confines of the re-organized district" would be uniform, "though obviously there might be 
different costs in the operation of different school ui~its." Id. at 506 (emphasis added). The same 
analysis applies here. Taxes throughout the confines of Ada County for court purposes must be 
uniform, though obviously there may be different costs in the operation of different "units" of the 
court. 
In order to comply with article VII, section 5, taxes for purposes of the magistrate 
division must be uniform throughout the county. Taxes are not unifonn. Boise City taxpayers 
are taxed for the first leg (Court Clerlc), the second leg (special levy for the district and 
magistrate court), the third leg (criminal magistrate attributable to Boise City), and the omitted 
fourth leg (criminal magistrate solely attributable to Ada County, Meridian, Garden City, Eagle, 
Star and Kuna). The remaining taxpayers in Ada County do not pay for all four legs. 
4. Funding the Court in ia Constitutionally Permissible Manner. 
Ada County's main theme running throughout this appeal and before the District Judges 
is this: "Ada County should not have to bear the sole financial burden of providing for the 
magistrate court." (R., Ex. 21, Mem. in Opp'n, p. 6.) Ada County bears no burden. The 
taxpayers do! Jt is easy for the County to forget that Boise City's taxpayers are also county 
taxpayers. Boise City residents pay the same county taxes as every other couf~ty resident, In 
addition, Boise's taxpayers pay to comply with the 1980 and 2008 orders to provide magistrate 
court. 
Ada County would have this Court believe it has no ability to f h d  the magistrate court, 
but for the reimbursement provided by the City in accordance with the 1999 MOA. This is 
simply inaccurate. 
Pursuant to a significant statutory framework put in place by a legislature mindful of a 
county's obligation (not burden) to provide court facilities, the County has myriad sources of 
revenue to fund c o w  functions. 
First, the County has the statutory authority to increase the County's district and 
magistrate court special levy. In 2007, the special fund required $3,016.808, so the respective 
levy was 000088966. (R. Ex. 8, Houde Aff., Ex. 1) In accordance with Idaho Code 5 31-867, the 
County may levy upon all taxable property of the county up to ,0496 for district and magistrate 
court functions. This simple, expedient (and statutorily sound) solution accomplishes several 
goals: (a) the courts would be adequately funded; (b) the ad valorem taxes would be equally and 
uniformly obtained from all taxpayers in Ada County, rather than on the backs of Boise City 
residents; and (c) it allows this Court to lift the 1980 Boise City Order and the 1994 Garden City 
and Meridian Orders requiring each entity to provide adequate separate coui-thouses and 
expenses. 
The second funding source is the revenue stream directly from Boise City's caseload. The 
court fee distribution formula set forth in Idaho Code 5 31-3201A(b) and (c) provides $5.00 for 
every misdemeanor and infraction in which an offender pleads guilty or is found guiIty. This fee 
goes directly to the County and is for the purpose of providing services for such cases. Using the 
numbers provided by the County for fiscal year 2007, the City of Boise's misdemeanor and 
infraction caseload could have provided Ada County with a potential $254,635. Zn fiscal year 
2006 that amount would have been $288,010. This is revenue the County receives without any 
obligation to provide prosecutorial services to recover. 
Finally, pursuant to Idaho Code (i 19-4705(d), the County receives ninety percent of fines 
imposed on all non-fish and game, and non-driving related offenses (including Boise City's 
misdemeanors and infractions) for deposit into the district court fund of Ada County. With 
misdemeanor fines ranging from $300 to $1,000, this number is potentially very significant. 
These revenue streams provide sufficient revenue to Ada County to fund the court. 
5. Equal Proleetion Violation is Clear. 
The equal protection violation in this case is glaringly clear. The County fails to cite to 
one case in support of its contention that there is no equal protection violation. 
The County also fails to distinguish the disparate treatment of the district court 
continuing to enforce the 1980 Order against Boise City, yet failing to enforce the 1994 Order 
against Meridian and Garden City. 
In 1994 the District Court understood that Boise City was unfairly shouldering the costs 
of magistrate court. The District Judges explained that Boise City and the other cities were in 
essence in the same class and therefore all needed to contribute. The District Court Judges found 
"it is no longer reasonable for the City of Boise and Ada County to bear sole financial 
responsibility for the processing of citations and complaints issued by other municipalities." (R., 
Ex. 20, Reiner znd Aff, Ex. A. at 1.) Yet despite this finding, the 1994 Order was not enforced. 
Enforcement of the 1980 Order through the 2008 Order singles out the City and its taxpayers in 
violation of the equal protection clause. 
@. THE COURT EWWED IN TI$EATI[NG THE CITY'S PETITION AS CIVIL 
LITIGATION. 
I. The 1980 Order is an Administrative Order. 
Idaho Code 5 1-2218 authorizes a majority of the district judges of a judicial district to 
order a city to provide a magistrate facility. Determining whether a magistrate facility is 
necessary for court functions is an act of court administration. 
This section is located in Title 1 of Idaho Code. Title 1 comprises the administrative nuts 
and bolts of the courts in Idaho. It does not create a cause of action. Unlike traditional litigation 
wherein one judge presides, Idaho Code 5 1-2218 contemplates the decision be made by a 
majority of the district judges of a judicial district. The statute simply does not provide for a 
traditional litigation process. 
2. The Court Erred in Allowing the County to Intervene. 
The court's error in granting Ada County's Motion to Intervene was its determination 
that the administrative matter between the City and the district judges was civil litigation. The 
City does not assert that the court improperly allowed the County to participate to the detriment 
of the City. The District Judges were within their purview to allow the participation of 
whomever they believe may have information to assist them in malting a decision. While they 
may find it helpful to their decision making process to receive information from the City, the 
County, the Trial Court Administrator and others, full scale civil litigation, including 
intervention, is not called for in Idaho Code 5 1-2218. Indeed, the City and the County should 
not be pitted against each other as adverse parties in court administraiive matters. 
3. The City Satisfied its Burden by Coming Forward. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code $ 1-2217 the law in the state of Idaho requires that counties 
provide suitable and adequate facilities for a magistrate division of the district court. Tlus 
obligation is only imposed upon a city under Idaho Code 5 1-2218 when a majority of the district 
judges deem it necessary, (e.g., the county's magistrate facility was not suitable andlor no longer 
adequate to handle the caseload). The County is correct that there is no statutory guidance 
provided to district judges as to what criteria would justify an order requiring a city to provide 
facilities for the magistrate's division. However, in deference to the taxpayers, such a decision 
would require a finding of necessity. It would be arbitrary to order a city to provide a magistrate 
facility where the county facility is suitable and adequate. 
When a city has been ordered to provide a facility, and the city subsequently provides 
that facility, it is reasonable for that city to ask the court to reconsider the order where 
circumstances have changed significantly over time. In doing so the district judges have an 
obligation to make reasonable inquiries --just as they presumably made in putting the order into 
place originally.' Acting in this administrative capacity the district judges are mandated to 
examine the current state of magistrate facilities in the district in light of the statutory language 
as set forth in Idaho Code $5 1-2217 and -2218. In short, are the current magishate facilities 
suitable and adequate such that an order to the City to provide a separate magistrate facility is not 
necessary? 
The City of Boise satisfied its burden in coming forward with the request that the 28- 
year-old order he reconsidered. The court failed to meet its obligation to analyze the condition 
of the existing magistrate facility and the need for the City to provide a separate magistrate 
facility. 
4. The Court did not Consider the Factors Provided in Idaho Code 3 1-2217. 
The County is wrong in asserting that the District Judges are compelled to look at the 
suitability and adequacy ofthe City facility. When the City of Boise filed its Petition to lift the 
order, it was incumbent upon the court to consider the suitability and adequacy of the current 
County magistrate court facility pursuant to Idaho Code 5 1-2217. While the court may well 
coiisider a city's caseload, it is error not to consider the adequacies of the current facility. 
5. The 1999 Memorandum of Understanding was Not a Court Consolidation 
Agreement and is Not tbe Subject of this Administrative Matter. 
The 1999 Memorandum of Understanding was not a courl collsolidation agreement. 
Contrary to Ada County's assertions and the finding of the District Judges, the agreement 
between the City and the County was little more than a transfer of employees from the City's 
employ to the County's. The language of the agreement makes it clear that the parties were 
simply transferring a group of employees and limited equipment. 
Paragraph 4 of the Memorandum makes it clear that the City's obligation would continue 
until the "function moved to the new Ada County Courthouse," or until renegotiated by the 
parties. In fact, the Agreement delineates the contractual financial obligations of the City for 
only two fiscal years - FY2000 and FY2001. (R., Ex. 19, Navarro 2nd Aff., Ex. C Attachment.) 
The payment schedule goes no further than 2001, nor does the agreement mention items more 
traditionally associated with a consolidatiol~ agreement where parties will be sharing a building 
and equipment. There is no mention of timelines for a move, or space allocation. 
6. The City was Compelled to Use the New County Facility. 
Ada County unilaterally built, pursuant to an advisory vote, a consolidated court and 
administration building sufficient in size for all of the magistrate judges in Ada County to be 
chambered. The City does not claim the County forced the City to move into the new facility. It 
was the Trial Court Administrator (TCA) and the Administrative Judge who had the authority to 
determine where judges would be chambered and where the cases would be handled. The TCA 
and the Administrative Judge dictated the move of the magistrate judges &om Barrister to the 
new courthouse. That decision was based on all informal finding that the City's magistrate 
facility was no longer necessary. The City was and is without authority to direct such a move or 
make suc11 a decision. 
D. THERE IS NO CONTINUING NECESSITY FOR BOISE CITY TO PROVIDE 
SUITABLE AND ADEQUATE QUARTERS FOR A MAGISTRATE'S DIVISION. 
Ada County attempts to support the 2008 Order by pointing out that Boise City has 
provided separate facilities for the magistrate's division since 1971 pursuant to Court Order. 
While that is true, it is undisputed that the Ada County Courthouse was inadcquate during those 
years to accommodate the number of courtrooms necessary to conduct the business of the 
magistrate's division after court refonn. The question is whether that necessity still exists. 
Neither Ada Counly nor the Judges of the Fourth Judlcial District suggest that the current Ada 
County Courthouse is unable to house the magistrate's division. 
Ada County's argument that Boise City was in some way involved in the decision to 
consolidate the County courts ignores that Ada County 
elected to provide at its sole cost and expense a single courthouse complex for 
both the District Court and the Magistrate's Division thereof, including the 
functions of the District Court, both civil and criminal, and probate court, police 
court and justice courts as those functions existed prior to judicial reorganization. 
(R., Ex. 19, Navarro 2nd Aff., Ex. C) (emphasis added) The most significant statutory 
requireinent for deciding which entity pays the expenses of the magistrate's division is which 
entity provides the facilities. It is undisputed that Ada County elected to provide the facilities. It 
is of no consequence that other governmental entities agreed with Ada County's decision to be 
the sole provider of the facilities. 
Ada County also suggests that the rationale in the 1994 Order, which found the volume of 
work generated by the cities of Garden City and Meridian justified those cities to provide 
facilities for the magistrate's division, "still holds true today." (Resp't Br. at 33.) But the fact is 
the District Judges have never enforced that Order. Moreover, since 2002 there has been no need 
for Garden City, Meridian or Boise City to provide facilities for the magistrate's division. Ada 
County is providing adequate and suitable facilities. 
Ada County now attempts to justify continuation of the 1980 Order on grounds that Boise 
City agreed to and did physically move its magistrate court to the Ada County Courthouse 
Complex because it recognized a continuing obligation to provide magistrate court facilities. 
Ada County does not explain how such a fact scenario, even if true, would result in ignoring 
Idaho Code 5 s  1-2217 and -2218 and the holding in Twin Falls County. The Court could not 
have been clearer when it held that: 
1.C 53 1-2217 and 2218 do not envision entwined or shared facilities and 
expenses. The entity which provides the building also provides the expenses 
associated with operating it. 
Twin Falls County, 143 Idaho at 400. 
The District Judges did not provide a valid factual or legal basis for continuing the 1980 
Order. The fact that Boise City generates a substantial percentage of the infractions and 
misdemeanors that are handled by the magistrate's division is not a valid legal basis for 
endorsing, encouraging or requiring Boise City to pay a portion of the expenses for the operating 
the new Ada County Courthouse Complex. The statutes and case law are clear that the entity 
providing the building, Ada County in this case, is responsible for providing the expenses 
associated with operating it. 
E. A D A  COUNTY IS NOT ENTITLED T O  A T T O m E Y ' S  FEES. 
The City's Petition was a request that a 28-year-old order, which has cost the City's 
taxpayers millions and millions of dollars, be reconsidered. As the County points out in its 
briefing, the City has been under the order of the court to provide some level of magistrate 
facilities for forty years. Simple prudence dictated that it was appropriate for the City to request 
the court reconsider the necessity of the order in light of years of changed circumstance, a new 
County-provided magistrate court facility and Twin Falls County. Yet the Counly asks this 
Court to award attorney fees to it under Idaho Code 5 12-121. 
Idaho Code $ 12-121 does not provide the County a basis for an award of fees. First, this 
is an administrative act, not an adversarial case, so the statute is inapplicable. 
Second, the statutory language in 5 12-121 states that it is not intended to "alter, repeal or 
amend any statute which otherwise provides for the award of attorney's fees." Idaho Code 5 12- 
121. Idaho Code 5 12-117 specifically applies to civil actions where a coullty is an adverse 
party. The more specific attorney fee statute applies where more than one statute seems to 
authorize an award of fees in a particular case. Shay v. Cesler, 132 Idaho 585, 588 (1999). The 
more specific statute in this case is Idaho Code 5 12-1 17 to which Ada County did not cite. 
Furthermore, although the County states that it is entitled to attorney fees under Idaho 
Code 5 12-121 because it is the prevailing party, the test under 5 12-121 is not whether the 
County prevailed, but whether the position the City presented was so plainly fallacious that it 
was not fairly debatable. Childres v. Wolters, 115 Idaho 527, 529 (Ct. App. 1988) citing GuCf 
Chemical Employees v. Williams, 107 Idaho 890 (Ct. App. 1984). "Attorney fees can be 
awarded on appeal under [Idaho Code 5 12-1211 only if the appeal was brought or defended 
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." Teton Peak Inv. Co., LLC v. Ohme, 146 
Idaho 394, 398 (2008) (citing Downey v. Vavold, 144 Idaho 592, 596 (2007); Bingharn v. 
Montane Resources Associates, 133 Idaho 420, 427 (1999) (fee award improper under Idaho 
Code 5 12-121 unless all claims frivolous). 
The City's request after forty years of providing magistrate facilities, considering the 
County's building of a consolidated courthouse which houses all of the magistrates formerly 
chambered at the City's Barrister location, cannot be said to be unreasonable or frivolous. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above arguments, the Appellant requests the District Judges' 2008 Order 
be reversed, the 1980 Order be set aside and Idaho Code 5 1-2218 be held unconstitutional. 
DATED this L\ day of February 2009. 
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